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Abstract: Traditional history claims that by the end of the eighteenth century, the Order 
of the Hospital had reached the end of a long-drawn-out process of secularization and 
decline. It also asserts that in 1798 the Hospitallers surrendered Malta as a direct result 
of this debilitating process. The paper argues against both misconceptions. First, at 
no stage in the eighteenth century, or indeed earlier, may the Order be said to have 
experienced decline. Secondly, within the current state of Hospitaller scholarship, its 
surrender of Malta may only be attributed to the devitalizing and crippling influence the 
French Revolution had on the institution.
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Notwithstanding the great strides Maltese historiography has made over the past fifty years or so, there are still a handful of myths surrounding our island’s early modern history, propagated 
from one generation to another. I can think of the original idea of the 
choice of Malta for the Order’s conventual headquarters after the loss 
of Rhodes, one that in fact belonged to L’Isle Adam himself rather than 
to Charles V or his viceroy in Sicily as traditionally assumed.1 Others 
include the popular perception of de Valette,2 woven almost entirely on 
knowledge of the man immediately before and during the Ottoman siege 
1 See V. Mallia-Milanes, Venice and Hospitaller Malta 1530–1798: Aspects of a Relationship 
(Malta, 1992), 2. For the traditional view, R. Valentini, ‘I Cavalieri di S. Giovanni da Rodi 
a Malta: Trattative diplomatiche’, Archivum Melitense, ix, 4 (1935), 6–7; A.P. Vella, Storja 
ta’ Malta, i (Malta, 1974), 184–5.
2 See V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘Fra Jean de la Valette 1495–1568: A Reappraisal’, in The Maltese 
Cross, ed. T. Cortis (Malta, 1995), 117–29.
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of Malta as well as the long-term historical significance of that episode.3 
This paper will deal with two other misconceptions — the idea of the 
decline of the Order and the attribution of the fall of Hospitaller Malta 
to this alleged decline. The concept of secularization and the much-
maligned Hompesch, both closely related aspects of the decline theory, 
will form the tail-end of the paper.
It has been traditionally claimed that the military-religious Order 
of St John lost Malta in June 1798 because of two major determining 
forces: in the first place, the institution had reached the extreme limit 
of its long-drawn-out process of decline; and, in the second place, its 
increasingly secularized magistracy had grown so weak that it could 
hardly offer the invading French forces any modicum of resistance. By 
the time Napoleon appeared on the horizon, the Order, originally set up 
over 700 years earlier, had become a pure anachronism. By the end of 
the eighteenth century, so runs the claim, the population of Malta and 
Gozo, some 91,000 in all, tired of the Order’s absolutist and paternalist 
style of government, had for years been seeking to overthrow the regime. 
My research indicates that this was not the case. In 1775, the year of the 
futile uprising of the priests which had miserably failed to stir up any 
popular support,4 Massimiliano Buzzaccarini Gonzaga, a high-ranking 
Hospitaller diplomat,5 observed that during the whole 245 years the 
Order had been on the island, it had always felt safe and serene among 
the local population whom it considered ‘loyal and affectionate’.6 
An accurate observer of manners and a sharp critic of whatever was 
happening around him and of developments in and outside Malta, he 
was not a man to be easily deluded. Nor could he fail to read clearly the 
signs of the times.
3 Id., ‘The Birgu Phase of Hospitaller History’, in Birgu: A Maltese Maritime City, ed. L. 
Bugeja et al (Malta, 1994), i, 73–96.
4 For the event, F. Laferla, Una giustizia storica: Don Gaetano Mannarino nella luce dei 
documenti (Rome, 1926) and P. Callus, The Rising of the Priests: Its Implications and Re-
percussions on Ecclesiastical Immunity (Malta, 1961).
5 V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘A Man with a Mission: A Venetian Hospitaller on Eighteenth-Century 
Malta’, in The Military Orders, Volume 4: On Land and By Sea, ed. Judi Upton Ward (Al-
dershot, 2008). 
6 Id., Al servizio della Repubblica di Venezia: Le Lettere di Massimiliano Buzzaccarini Gon-
zaga, Commendatore di Malta, inviate alla Magistratura dei Cinque Savii alla Mercan-
zia 1754–1776 (Vatican City, 2014), Letter CCXII, 562. See also F. Ciappara, ‘The “Great 
Fear” of the French Revolution in Malta’, Proceedings of History Week 1999 (Malta, 2002), 
137–57, 145.
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In 1929, in her influential Malta of the Knights, Elizabeth 
Schermerhorn claimed that the Hospitaller magistracy no longer 
enjoyed divine creative inspiration: ‘its faith burned low’. She describes 
‘the brilliancy of Valletta’s court’ as ‘a gilded shell, ready to collapse 
under the first determined fingers that grasped it’.7 Then she resorts to 
Patrick Brydone’s equally influential account of his visit to Malta8 in 
support of her second claim – the widespread immorality among the 
Order’s younger generation.9 This delicate issue demands a thorough 
exploration and understanding through extensive analytical research. 
I am not aware that this has ever been done. Numbers are vital in 
this field too, because one or two of the proverbial swallows do not a 
summer make. Until then, such an unfounded damaging vision does not 
deserve an uncritical acceptance. A third claim by the same historian – 
the Hospital ‘could not weather the shock of the French Revolution ... 
because its Treasury was bankrupt’;10 in fact, the reverse is correct. The 
Common Treasury went bankrupt as a direct outcome of the Revolution 
and its wars.
The historical narrative is a truth-seeking exercise but the above 
judgements distort, perhaps unwittingly, our vision of the past. There 
is an inherent flaw in the traditional argument. The brutal truth is that 
the attribution of the fall of Malta to Hospitaller decline is intrinsically 
faulty because the ‘decline’ of the Order is not a historical reality. No 
sufficiently convincing supporting empirical evidence has ever been 
brought forward, 
The traditional vision of the fall of Malta demands a redefinition. It 
is the evidence which dictates the historical narrative, the reconstruction 
of the form and content of the realities of the past – the dynamism of 
the Hospitaller institution. To be plausible, this reconstruction, indeed 
any reconstruction of any aspect of the past, should be the product 
of an empirical and rationally analytical methodology. The present 
paper challenges both views, the two misconceived concepts – first, 
the decline of the Order and, secondly, the attribution of the fall of 
Hospitaller Malta to that alleged process. 
7 E. Schermerhorn, Malta of the Knights (Surrey, 1929),  277. 
8 Patrick Brydone, A Tour through Sicily and Malta in a series of letters to William Beckford, 
2 volumes (London, 1773). For Malta, i, 305–45.
9 Schermerhorn, 277.
10 Ibid.
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The process of change and the ageing process are two distinct and 
unrelated phenomena. If they weren’t, the whole story of humanity 
would have been an unbroken history of decline, from creation to 
the present day. It is change for the worse which may be considered 
synonymous with decline. The difficulty lies in distinguishing the 
different stages of change, in determining whether the latest stage 
was worse than its predecessor or simply different, whether the whole 
process was worsening or simply taking a different direction.
The Order of the Hospital
Through its astonishing powers of resilience, its constant ability to 
adapt to new conditions, the Hospital, much unlike Venice, for example, 
allowed itself to evolve and adjust in its own way in response to changes 
that had been thrust upon it, often forcibly – like those of 1187, 1291, and 
1522. Although the past had always been the Order’s source of strength, 
the institution never looked backward or seriously tried, as Braudel 
would say,11 to move backward. The real crisis the Order faced towards 
the end of the eighteenth century emerged with the fall of the Bastille 
on 14 July 1789. In France, now engulfed in civil war, lay the Order’s 
three richest langues: Provence, Auvergne, and France. This social and 
economic reality allowed the French to enjoy enormous power within 
the Hospital. For all intents and purposes, the institution was French-
dominated. The major military and naval positions, and the principal 
administrative and judicial organs of the State — like the finances, the 
arsenal, the artillery, the hospices on the European priories, and the 
hospital in Malta — were either occupied or controlled by members of 
the French langues. Jacques Godechot defines Grand Master de Rohan 
himself as ‘a truly French sovereign’. In brief, the fate of the Order lay 
exclusively in French hands. The Hospital was far too aristocratic, far 
too wealthy, far too loyal to the now discredited French monarchy, its 
principal patron, ‘to avoid the antagonism of the sans culottes’.12
On 4 August 1789, the tithe was abolished. Land and feudal rights 
were the Hospital’s main sources of wealth, providing its Common 
11 F. Braudel, A History of Civilizations, trans. Richard Mayne (New York, 1993), 363.
12 Whitworth Porter, Malta and its Knights (London, 1871), 270.
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Treasury with a regular flow of revenue that financed all its activities. 
In July 1791 it was decreed that every Frenchman belonging to any 
Order of chivalry which demanded proofs of nobility as an essential 
requirement for admission would lose his citizenship.13 In 1792 
the revolutionary armies exported the civil war to their continental 
neighbours; what had hitherto been confined to within the republic’s 
borders was now extended to the rest of old Europe. Four short days, 
from 19 to 22 September 1792, defined the nature of the Hospitaller 
crisis. On 19 September the Legislative Assembly decreed, among its 
last acts, the loi spoliateur which confiscated the Order’s estates in 
France and declared them national property. On 21 September France 
was declared a republic. The next day, the monarchy was abolished. 
Exactly within a month, on 22 October, the Convention decreed the 
sale of all moveable property within Hospitaller houses. The Order was 
being treated like all the other religious houses and those of the émigrés. 
So, between 1792 and 1798, the Order found itself overnight a net loser:
• It lost most of its European property. The Order’s landed estates, 
its main source of revenue, were among the spoils forged by the 
revolutionary wars of conquest and territorial aggrandizement 
in Northern Italy, Belgium, and Luxembourg, the territory on 
the west bank of the Rhine from Basel to Andernach, and Spain. 
The Treaty of Campo Formio (October 1797), which reshaped 
the map of Europe, marked definitively the collapse of the 
First Coalition against France and confirmed the Revolution’s 
achievements.
• It lost the patronage of the French monarchy and of its other 
traditional European protectors. To its patrons it owed its political 
relevance and its distinct privileged Europe-wide position. To 
them it owed its liberty to enjoy the fruit of its estates in Europe. 
To them, indeed, it owed the independence it had gained after 
1310 in Rhodes and then in Malta.
• It lost its otherwise impregnable central Mediterranean fortress 
of Malta, which had accommodated its Convent for over two-
and-a-half centuries. 
13 Ibid., 271; also Alain Blondy, ‘Malta and France 1789–1798: The Art of Communicating a 
Crisis’, in Hospitaller Malta 1530–1798: Studies on Early Modern Malta and the Order of 
St John of Jerusalem, ed. V. Mallia-Milanes (Malta, 1993), 666–7.
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• It lost the right to territorial sovereignty. 
• Worst of all, it lost its ability to defend itself.
The Revolution shattered the Order. What the eyewitness Hospitaller 
Antonio Miari, the Venetian resident representative in Malta, observed 
in 1793 applied also to the subsequent five years: the amount of work 
needed and the enormous expenses required to put up a solid defence 
against any possible aggression would produce ‘consequences of an 
evil by far greater than those of a war which the French could ever hope 
to wage by their arms’.14 
The irreversible change for the worse the Order began to experience 
after the fall of the Bastille had been dictated by revolutionary forces 
from outside the institution – pressing, unnatural, debilitating. Bastille 
was not a single isolated event. Historians tend to accord it a symbolic 
value. It was more significant than that. It marked the culmination 
of a whole century of intellectual revolution and the beginning of a 
radical turmoil that permanently transformed the political, social, and 
cultural structures of Europe and eventually the rest of the world. 
The enlightened doctrine of equality, which the philosophes had been 
preaching for the entire eighteenth century, a philosophy which the 
Order had practised with the inmates of its hospitals and hospices since 
its foundation, now transformed itself into a war against the principle of 
privilege, which lay at the very heart of the Ancien Régime and against 
the Order of which it formed an intimate part. The Order as an exempt 
institution of the Church had been based on privilege since 1113.15 The 
staggering revolutionary tsunami left a trail of destruction of the old. 
The civil war in France marked a complete break with the centuries-old 
cultural tradition of Europe. The abolition of the principle of privilege 
spelled the collapse of old Europe and consequently the near extinction 
of the Hospital. In no way was this destabilizing crisis a symptom of 
a cancerous tumour, growing and virulently spreading its malignant 
14 For Miari’s observations, V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘Towards the End of the Order of the Hospital: 
Reflections on the Views of Two Venetian Brethren – Antonio Miari and Ottavio Benvenuti’, 
in The Military Orders, Volume 5: Politics and Power, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Surrey, 2012), 
165–85: 167–77.
15 See Anthony T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitaller Privilege of 1113: Text and Context’, forthcoming 
in The Military Orders, Volume 6.1: Culture and Conflict in the Mediterranean World, ed. 
Jochen Schenk & Mike Carr (Aldershot, 2017).
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tentacles within the institution. The traditional vision simply does not 
reflect historical reality. On the eve of the fall of the Bastille, as will be 
shown, the state of the Hospital in its various functions, according to 
objective surviving evidence, was perfectly healthy. 
I have scanned with great care and caution the massive correspondence 
carried out between Venetian resident ministers in Malta and the Adriatic 
Republic and between the Order’s receivers in Venice and the lords 
of the Common Treasury in Valletta. Collectively these letters span 
almost the entire second half of the eighteenth century, from 1754 to 
1797. It was only in the 1790s that these representatives, high-ranking 
members of the Hospital, brought up the issue of the contemporary 
threat seriously challenging their Order’s existence. There is no 
allusion to any conceptual or visual symptoms of decline, for example, 
in Massimiliano Buzzaccarini Gonzaga’s detailed and analytical letters 
from Malta between 1754 and 1776.16 On the contrary, in one of his later 
letters he claimed he could still perceive the Hospitaller principality as 
fulfilling its professed and accomplished commitments – the spiritual 
and physical rehabilitation of the sick poor and the extension of their 
naval and military establishments and of their medical knowledge and 
expertise to defend Christian Europe as much against Islam as against 
the plague and other natural calamities. The Order’s immediate response 
to the dreadful earthquake that devastated Sicily and Calabria in 1783 is 
a classic example.17 Nowhere is there in these Venetian letters, at times 
fairly critical of the Order and the magistracy, the vaguest suggestion 
that the Hospitaller institution was growing somehow visibly weaker 
and weaker. Symptoms of decline could not have been hidden from the 
subtle Venetian observers.
There is no such intimation either in Alviero Zacco’s equally 
thorough and exhaustive correspondence written from Malta when 
Buzzaccarini Gonzaga was on extended leave of absence to visit his 
native Padua and again after he had passed away in 1776.18 It was not the 
myth of the ageing process that struck almost fatally at the Order in the 
16 See Mallia-Milanes, Al servizio della Repubblica di Venezia.
17 See R. Cavaliero, The Last of the Crusaders: The Knights of St John and Malta in the Eigh-
teenth Century (London, 1960), 69–70; F. Ryan, The House of the Temple: A Study of Malta 
and its Knights in the French Revolution (London, 1930), 120–4.
18 Mallia-Milanes, Al servizio della Repubblica di Venezia, 16–17 and n. 2; 19–20; 95–6, n. 
289; Letter XXXVII, 219–20.
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1790s. Nor ironically was the blow delivered by the Ottoman Empire, 
its traditional enemy. Indeed the progressive Sultan Selim III had even 
tried to reach a peace settlement and trade agreement with the Order 
in 1796, an invitation to reach some form of a truce which De Rohan 
declined.19 As two other Venetian brethren, Antonio Miari and Ottavio 
Benvenuti, so eloquently acknowledged in their correspondence, the 
swipe came from Revolutionary France.20
Miari’s letters, addressed to the Doge in Venice, provide profound 
insight into the state of the Order in the mid- and late-1790s and into the 
prevailing situation on Malta. He refers to the Order’s revenues, shrunk 
considerably since the Bastille episode, and the Treasury’s persistent 
endeavour to curtail expenses. Negotiating loans was not enough. The 
only solution, he envisaged, was to raise the value of responsions, 
the annual net income the Treasury received from all the priories in 
Europe, admitting that to resort to such drastic measures would be too 
insensitive to the currently pressing material and psychological needs of 
the brethren. Such extreme measures, he confessed, necessary though 
they were, would signal ‘the final stages of our existence’.21 
The situation grew worse with the certain prospect of war. In Malta, 
in 1796, talk of a military conflict was widespread, ‘now perhaps more 
than ever’, he pointed out. In fact, he reiterated, not only were there 
no sufficient funds to finance a long and hugely expensive war, there 
were hardly any to sustain the Order’s own existence.22 Fredrick Ryan23 
highlights the discord that pervaded the Order and attributes it partly 
to the novel spirit of nationalism, partly to jealousy, and partly to the 
‘provocative conduct of individual members of the Order’.24 So does 
Miari in his letters who blames the French knights for most of this 
discordance. Having lost practically everything, he points out, members 
of the three French langues were sunk in a spirit of despair, resigned 
to the oncoming tide of total destruction. Within such a disconcerting 
framework, tension, fear, and apprehension were perhaps unavoidable, 
natural, and understandable. What is not as understandable is to qualify 
19 See id., Venice and Hospitaller Malta, 291–5.
20 See id., ‘Towards the End of the Order of the Hospital’, 165–85.
21 Ibid., 167–8, and n. 9.
22 Ibid., 170.
23 Ryan, 112.
24 Mallia-Milanes, ‘Towards the End of the Order’, 170.
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the dissension, conflicts, and friction prevailing within the Order, as 
Ryan does, as symptoms of decline. Difference of opinion and lack 
of perfect harmony inside large multinational communities are not 
unnatural or abnormal qualities, then as now. The state of the European 
Union today is a classic example. In the context of the first revolutionary 
decade, the reverse would have been an astonishing surprise. 
The Hospital’s Vitality
Within a decade or so of the urgent reform measures introduced by the 
general chapter of 1776, the Hospital and its conventual principality 
began to show clear signs of vitality again. With the responsions raised 
to half-a-million scudi a year, the general finances ‘reached a high 
degree of prosperity’. De Rohan succeeded, reports William Thornton, 
‘in procuring a large available fund to the Treasury, after the outlay of 
very considerable sums to promote the future income of the Order’.25 
Between 1762 and 1771, the Treasury’s annual income had fallen from 
over 1,900,000 scudi to slightly over 800,000. Then, between 1778 
and 1788, its average annual income rose again to over 1,300,000 
scudi, most of which came from outside Malta. During these years, 
the total population of Malta and Gozo stood at c.91,000 — healthy, 
well-fed, and secure. The traditional privateering activity in the Levant 
was revived.26 ‘The 1790s,’ it has been recently claimed,27 ‘at least for 
the corso, was a decade of success.’ The average annual revenue, for 
instance, earned from prizes in the Levant between 1787 and 1798 
amounted to 65,629 scudi. The amount earned from the same source 
in 1796 alone was 117,000 scudi.28 Trade developed, with Valletta’s 
conversion into a flourishing entrepôt centre between East and West 
reconfirmed.29 With the profound social, economic, and cultural 
transformation which the entire principality had experienced over the 
25 W.H. Thornton, Memoir on the Finances of the Order (Malta, 1836). The Maltese silver 
scudo was equivalent to c.2 shillings sterling.
26 Mallia-Milanes, ‘Towards the End of the Order’, 168–9.
27 Liam Gauci, In the Name of the Prince: Maltese Corsairs 1760–1798 (Malta, 2016), 27.
28 A.T. Luttrell, ‘Eighteenth-Century Malta: Prosperity and Problems’, Hyphen [Malta], iii, 2 
(1982), 45.
29 Ibid.
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previous 240 years, late medieval Malta as portrayed in the 1524 eight 
commissioners’ report30 and in Jean Quintin’s account of 1536,31 had 
become almost unrecognizable. 
Until 1789 any scrupulous contemporary political observer would 
have had ample evidence of this renewed vitality in all the Hospital’s 
major manifestations and of its positive response to that development. 
First, the number of admissions into the Order was rising. It was 2,128 
knights-strong on the eve of the Bastille episode, 373 higher than the 
1631 figure. Of these, if Henry Sire’s recent claim is anything to go by, 
900 were under 25.32 
Secondly, viewed holistically from above, the Order, a massive land-
owning institution, in the later eighteenth century experienced physical 
territorial expansion. In 1776 it acquired circa 40 new commanderies by 
amalgamating the Order of Canons of St Anthony of Vienne. Another 
14 commanderies came from the setting up in 1774 of the Grand Priory 
of Poland with its 28 commanderies. Two years later this priory was 
incorporated into the dormant Grand Priory of England to form part of 
the newly established Anglo-Bavarian Langue. Moreover, as happened 
on several other earlier occasions, a number of the Order’s traditional 
commanderies were divided to form new ones and meet the pressing 
needs of new recruits.33 These were the Hospitaller estates, immediately 
recognizable through the eight-pointed cross chiselled prominently on 
their façades, cultivated urban and rural spaces, different in size and 
heterogeneous, but similar in essential structures. Here most of the 
brethren conducted their everyday private and public lives, sustaining 
long-established networks of Europe-wide social interactions. Through 
them, the Hospital exercised continuing influence. The Revolution failed 
to destroy the Order, but it succeeded in uprooting this uninterrupted 
force of continuity in Europe’s historical development.
Thirdly, till the very end of its stay on Malta, the Order remained as 
active in its naval and military role as it had always been. The serious 
30 For the report, Iacomo Bosio, Dell’Istoria della Sacra Religione et Ill.ma Militia di S. Gio. 
Gierosolimitano, Part iii (Rome, 1602), 30–1; L. de Boisgelin, Ancient and Modern Malta 
(London, 1804), ii, 15–17.
31 See H.C.R. Vella, The Earliest Description of Malta (Lyons 1536) by Jean Quintin d’Autun 
(Malta 1980).
32 H.J.A. Sire, The Knights of Malta: A Modern Resurrection (London, 2016), 11.
33 See ibid., 12–14.
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threat of an Ottoman invasion in 1760, in retaliation for the Ottoman 
Crown episode,34 indicated that the knights had not changed their ways. 
In 1775 and 1784, the Order participated in Spain’s punitive expeditions 
against Algiers.35 In the latter year and again in 1791, it helped Venice in 
her war against Tunis.36 If the Order’s role in formal war against Islam 
appeared to be diminishing, compared to its performance in earlier 
centuries, it was because such wars were no longer as frequent as they 
had been in the past. By the mid-eighteenth century the Ottoman threat 
did not remain as impressive as it had traditionally been in the sixteenth 
century and certain European powers, like France and Spain, were 
subtly promoting a growing cordiality with the Empire in the hope of 
reaching trade agreements with the Porte. This, however, did not erode 
the Order’s military role because it continued to police as efficiently as 
before the central Mediterranean against the widespread piracy based 
on the Barbary Coast; naval historians of the Order, like Ettore Rossi37 
and Ubaldino Mori Ubaldini,38 provide a fair picture of these activities. 
Moreover, archival records show that in 1796–97 the arsenal was busy 
constructing, among other works, two mezzegalere (the San Pietro and 
the San Andrea) for the papal navy39 and refitting other war vessels.40 
Nor did this development insidiously weaken the institution’s 
political relevance. The brethren’s training, military qualities, and naval 
expertise were still highly esteemed throughout Europe, evidenced by 
the brilliant careers and rapid promotions which certain Hospitallers 
occupied in various royal courts and European armies, navies, and 
34 See, for example, Cavaliero, 142–3.
35 See U. Mori Ubaldini, La marina del Sovrano Militare Ordine di San Giovanni di Gerusa-
lemme di Rodi e di Malta (Rome, 1971), 508–9.
36 Ibid., 510–11. Also V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘The Buona Unione: An Episode in Veneto-Maltese 
Relations in the Late Eighteenth Century’, Journal of the Faculty of Arts [University of 
Malta], iv, 4 (1971), 309–26.
37 E. Rossi, Storia della marina dell’Ordine di S. Giovanni di Gerusalemme di Rodi e di Malta 
(Rome-Milan, 1926).
38 Cited in note 35 above.
39 See N[ational] L[ibrary of] M[alta], A[rchives of the] O[rder of St John,] M[alta], Arch.1923, 
‘Conto che rende il Cav. Nicola Buzi come commissario per la costruzione delle due mez-
zegalere di Sua Santità, cominciata il 10 ottobre 1795 e terminate il 26 agosto 1796’. 
40 See ibid., Arch. 1907, Libro Maestranze dell’Arsenale, dal primo maggio 1796 a tutto aprile 
del 1797. This archive has been described as a register containing ‘l’annotazione dei salari 
dati … alle maestranze impiegate nel riattimento, concia e spalmatura delle galere, galeotte 
di guardia, caracche e altre imbarcazioni.’ Catalogue of the Records of the Order of St John 
of Jerusalem in the Royal Malta Library, comp. Rev. J. Mizzi, xii (Malta, 1968), 162.
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colonial enterprises – particularly in those of France, Spain, Naples, 
Sardinia, and the Papal States. In 1789, to instance one, Catherine the 
Great sought the services of an experienced knight of Malta to help her 
set up a galley squadron for her Russian fleet in the Baltic. De Rohan 
dispatched the young Count Giulio Litta, from Milan, aged 22. By the 
time he left Russia in 1790, he had already been promoted to the rank 
of counter-admiral.41 
The Order remained dutifully firm and unwavering in its statutory 
attitude towards the Turk. On the other hand, if the Hospitaller galley 
squadron was reduced from 5 to 4, the ship-of-the-line squadron 
was raised from 4 to 5. These were changes made in response partly 
to technological developments, partly to contemporary demands, 
especially in response to the fact that the Muslim threat was gradually 
receding. The knights’ war against Islam was not an ‘optional’ naval 
activity. Nor, claims John Taaffe, was it ‘aggressive’. It was, he explains, 
‘simply defensive’.42
There is a fourth feature – the role the Order played as a religious and 
as a hospitalling institution. From the religious and spiritual dimension, 
by the time Napoleon reached Malta, ‘the Offices of the day and the 
calendar of the liturgical year’, it has been shown,43 ‘shaped’ the regular 
life of the brotherhood, as they had done in the eleventh century. On 
the other hand, in 1964, referring to what he termed ‘the decadence of 
the Order,’ and basing himself solely on John Howard’s 1789 negative 
account on the Holy Infirmary,44 Paul Cassar wrote that ‘[i]t was inevitable 
that the infirmary should share in this deterioration’.45 This is one other 
misconception taken as fact. On Rhodes, as on Malta, the conventual 
hospitals ‘retained their importance’, explains Anthony Luttrell, ‘precisely 
because they conspicuously maintained the ancient tradition of service 
41 Cavaliero, 205–6. For a short bibliography, [Rev.] Joseph Mizzi, ‘A Bibliography of the 
Order of St John of Jerusalem (1925–1969)’ in Council of Europe, The Order of St John in 
Malta, with an exhibition of paintings by Mattia Preti Painter and Knight (Malta, 1970), 
108–204, entries 1480–6.
42 J. Taaffe, The History of the Holy, Military, Sovereign Order of St John of Jerusalem (Lon-
don, 1832), bk. iv, 193.
43 A. Williams, ‘The Constitutional Development of the Order of St John in Malta, 1530–
1798’, in Mallia-Milanes, Hospitaller Malta, 285.
44 John Howard, An Account of the Principal Lazarettos in Europe (London, 1789). Howard 
spent some three weeks in Malta in the winter of 1786. For his account on Malta’s lazarettos, 
ibid., 8–9; for his account on the island’s hospitals; ibid., 58–61.
45 P. Cassar, A Medical History of Malta (London, 1964), 49.
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to the poor and the sick’.46 Indeed, it was the hospital in Rhodes and 
later in Malta, he points out, that ‘effectively defined the Convent’.47 In 
1930, the vision put forward by Frederick Ryan is anchored by the view 
of several other observers, like Henry Teonge,48 George Sandys,49 and 
Edward Brown,50 and of ‘a vast amount of evidence’, notwithstanding 
his familiarity with Howard.51 In Ryan’s view, the Order ‘was faithful 
to the duties of “Hospitality” to the end of its days in Malta’.52 Between 
1779 and 1788 the average annual expenditure on the hospital amounted 
to £8,000. In 1796, continues Ryan, ‘the Treasury still was able to find 
£6,000 for its upkeep’.53 There is ‘a vast amount of evidence’, he asserts, 
to show that the hospital in Malta ‘was well abreast of its time from the 
scientific point of view, and that from the religious standpoint this great 
hospital was ably fulfilling, with a multitude of other activities in Malta, 
the great function of a centre for corporal works of mercy’.54
There are two other issues that need to be discussed. One is the 
concept of secularization. The other concerns the criticism levelled at 
Grand Master Ferdinand Hompesch.
Secularization
Secularization is defined as the slow conversion of an ecclesiastical or 
religious state to a lay one, the process of laicization, of depriving an 
institution of its religious character, dissociating it from religious or 
spiritual concerns, turning it from a religious or spiritual state to one 
of worldliness.55 Within the historical context of the Order’s evolution, 
46 A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers’ Medical Tradition: 1291–1530’, in The Military Orders, Volume 
1: Fighting for the Faith and Caring for the Sick, ed. Malcolm Barber (Aldershot, 1994), 80.
47 Ibid.
48 H. Teonge, The diary of Henry Teonge … 1675–1679, ed. G.E. Manuring (London, 1927). 
Section on Malta: 121–2, 264–5.
49 G. Sandys, Travels … , 6th edn. (London, 1670). Section on Malta, 177–83.
50 J. Campbell, The travels and adventures of Edward Brown ... containing his account of the 
Isle of Malta (London, 1739). Section on Malta, 174–91.
51 Ryan, 117.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, ed. Lesley Brown, 
sub voce.
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from the latter’s humble origins, the Hospital’s was not a process of 
conversion, of turning from one state into another; it was a process, 
necessary and inevitable, of assuming a new and related dimension, 
while simultaneously retaining the original ones. Secularization evolved 
naturally from the Order’s military role.
The first hundred years of the Order’s existence in Jerusalem, from 
about the 1080s to the 1180s, were years of deep, formative, and lasting 
influence. They thrust upon the nascent institution its shape, its form, its 
character, which it uninterruptedly absorbed, unbroken and unshaken, 
till its last days in Malta. During its years in Latin Syria, observes 
the late Jonathan Riley-Smith,56 the Hospital, through its ‘privileged, 
international position as a great Order of the Church’,57 cultivated a 
profound sense of independence, it grew wealthier, it gained considerable 
experience in efficient administration, skilful negotiation, and good 
government, and turned into a significant force of political influence. 
From these early years, in the sole interests of its self-preservation, this 
‘multilingual and supranational religious corporation’, began to excel 
in the delicate art of diplomacy,58 the Hospital’s forte, we are told,59 both 
in defence of its own zealously shielded privileges and ‘for interacting 
with the respective foreign policies of its principal protectors’. In 
disputes between Christian princes, its ‘ideal of neutrality’, so ably 
upheld by its skilful diplomats and experienced ambassadors accredited 
to the major sovereign courts of Europe, was a very useful and valuable 
asset. In the twelfth century too, the Hospital is known to have already 
owned ships. By the end of the following century, when it transferred 
its Convent to Cyprus, ‘it permanently sustained a fleet, commanded by 
its own brethren’ and which it employed for the transport of troops and 
supplies, defence, and for its participation in warlike activities.60 Within 
this formative context, it consolidated its commitment to the care of 
the sick and the poor and to the military defence of the Holy Land. It 
56 J. Riley-Smith, The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus c.1050–1310 (London, 
1967), 78.
57 Ibid., 79.
58 Ibid., 367.
59 D. Allen, ‘The Order of St John as a “School for Ambassadors” in Counter-Reformation 
Europe’, in The Military Orders, Volume 2: Welfare and Warfare, ed. Helen Nicholson (Al-
dershot, 1998), 363.
60 See Jürgen Sarnowsky, ‘The Military Orders and their Navies’, The Military Orders, Volume 
4: On Land and by Sea, ed. Judy Upton-Ward (Aldershot, 2008), 45.
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was the powerful spirit of nationalism in the nineteenth century and the 
gradual extinction of the threat of Islam to Europe that transformed the 
institution into the one we know today. 
There were three distinct stages that moulded the Order’s 
evolution. First, the institution came into existence in response to two 
developments; the treacherous conditions prevailing in the Near East 
prompted the need for its creation, while the profound and lasting 
influence of the great reform movement within the Church determined 
the form it would assume – from a lay confraternity it evolved into a 
religious and charitable institution to serve pilgrims and the needy. By 
1156 a medical hospital had already existed in the Convent. That was the 
first stage. This act of charity was later extended to reach the pilgrims 
on their way to the Holy Land, marking the initial move in the direction 
of the institution’s second stage – the process of militarization. Shortly 
after the First Crusade, from the 1130s, the Order, which two decades 
earlier Paschal II had formally recognized through his Pie postulatio 
voluntatis61 as an exempt Order of the Church, began gradually to be 
assigned the custody of a number of newly constructed castles, the 
task of fighting for the Faith. Innocent II’s brief Quam amabilis Deo 
of 20 February 1131 is one of the earliest surviving documents which 
refers to the Order’s dual character.62 By 1180 the Order owned 25 such 
castles. That was the second pronounced stage in the natural evolution 
of the Hospital which dictated its logical development – the defence of 
the Holy Land along with the other military orders. 
Then the Hospitallers’ ‘increasing participation in military affairs’ 
led to the third stage in this process of transformation – the Hospital’s 
unavoidable direct involvement in the power politics of the Latin 
Kingdom. ‘By the end of the twelfth century,’ writes Riley-Smith,63 
‘the Hospitallers had become an essential element in the defence of 
the Latin settlement.’ This defining character, dictated by the social 
reality in which the Order was evolving, composed of these three 
constituent qualities – religious, military, and secular – remained with 
the Hospitallers even after they had been evicted from the Holy Land 
in 1291: in Limassol on Cyprus, in Rhodes, and in Malta. On Rhodes, 
61 See note 15 above.
62 See, for example, J. Riley-Smith, The Knights Hospitaller in the Levant, c.1070–1309 (UK, 
2012), 36.
63 Id., The Knights of St John, 77.
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freed from the feudal ties of Syria’s ‘Crusader overlords’,64 the Order 
gained independence and sovereignty and continued to evolve at a 
faster rhythm into a small but efficient naval power. Of both Rhodes and 
Malta, the Hospitallers created island-states; on both, the grand master 
ruled as a sovereign head of state, with Antoine De Paule drawing a 
clear distinction between affairs of state, to be recorded from the 1620s 
in the Libri Conciliorum Status, and matters pertaining to the Order as 
a religious corporation, minuted as they had always been in the Libri 
Conciliorum. Malta was turned into a principality, under the rule of a 
prince grand master – enlightened, benevolent, absolute.
Viewed within this dimension of secularization, the grant of special 
powers to L’Isle Adam and de Valette to manage the finances, defined as 
‘dangerous precedents’,65 were rather necessary measures prompted by 
the prevailing crisis or current war conditions. But it also reflected the 
process of consolidating magistral authority, becoming more and more 
pronounced, as Emanuel Buttigieg convincingly demonstrates,66 under 
Grand Master Verdalle, until it reaches its peak under Pinto. It was a 
natural evolution of the Hospitaller constitution in perfect harmony with 
contemporary political developments in Europe. The Order’s statutes 
and ordinances bear witness to the institution’s continuous process of 
adaptation to meet emerging new needs.
Secularization was a strong formative force which distinguished 
the Hospitaller institution from the purely contemplative and monastic 
Orders of the Church. The Hospitallers’ place was in the wider secular 
world. John Milton’s definition of the ‘true wayfaring Christian’ fits the 
Hospitallers to near-perfection: ‘He that can apprehend and consider 
vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet 
distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better.’67 Theirs was not 
‘a fugitive and cloistered virtue’.68 True temperance is the ability ‘to 
see and know, and yet abstain’.69 The long and chequered history of the 
64 Williams, 287.
65 Ibid., 288.
66 E. Buttigieg, ‘Politics and Power in Grand Master Verdalle’s Statute Hospitalis Hierusalem 
(1588)’, in The Military Orders, Volume 5: Politics and Power, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Surrey, 
2012), 153–64: 
67 John Milton, Areopagitica, in Milton’s Prose, selected and ed. Malcolm W. Wallace, in The 
World’s Classics (London, 1925), 290.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., 291.
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Hospital was a purifying trial of strength, ‘and trial is’, says Milton, ‘by 
what is contrary’.70 Secularization does not appear to have distracted 
from the institution’s other functions – the care of the sick and the poor 
and the defence first of the Holy Land and then of Christian Europe. In no 
way can that process, given the present state of historical scholarship, be 
therefore considered to have been a symptom of decadence or decline.
Grand Master Ferdinand von Hompesch
About two decades ago, in a conference on the military orders at 
Palmela in Portugal, I had pointed out that, in the political history 
of Europe, few personalities seem to have been more maligned 
than Ferdinand Hompesch.71 Historians, basing their views on the 
judgements of contemporary observers, have lavished a wide range of 
bitter accusations on the man. He has been depicted as having had little 
grasp of the hard political and economic problems facing Malta and 
little capacity for seeking advice to enable him and his Council to come 
to grips with them. By far the most outstanding difficulty in analysing 
the validity of this record of the grand master’s performance derives 
from the character of the sources at the disposal of the historian.
This is what Elisabeth Schermerhorn had to say on this issue:72
In the heat of the dispute that followed the surrender and departure of the knights – 
as to whether the Order or the Maltese had been the cowards, whether Grandmaster 
Hompesch had been a martyr or a traitor, or a mere dummy, whether every possible 
preparations for resistance had been made in advance, or nothing done at all – all sorts 
of horrible recriminations and sensational stories were passed about in pamphlets and 
memorials and petitions, on which small reliance can be placed.
This archival documentation is biased. It is the product of dissent, 
and what is worse is that it has remained the source of inspiration of so 
70 Ibid., 290.
71 V. Mallia-Milanes, ‘Grandmaster Ferdinand von Hompesch and the end of the Order in 
Malta: A Reassessment’, in Ordens Militares: Guerra, religiāo, poder e cultura: Actas do III 
Encontro sober Ordens Militares. Palmela, 22 a 25 de Janeiro de 1998, ed. Isabel Cristina 
F. Fernandes (Palmela, 1998),  i,  93–9.
72 Schermerhorn, 300.
many traditional historians and their work. In the preface to his History 
of Malta during the period of the French and British Occupations, 
published in 1909, William Hardman observes that ‘owing to the 
want of such official information in the past, authors have in many 
instances wandered from the truth’. But complete reliance on official 
documentation alone may itself prove dangerous as it too may contribute 
to bias and distortion.
Today, over two centuries later, this perception of Hompesch has 
not changed. A recent study of the Order in modern times reaffirms 
this view, although no new supporting archival evidence has been 
produced.73 In brief, the traditional portrait of Malta’s last grand master 
is questionable. The foundation is too weak to sustain any further 
arguments, like holding the man, even in part, responsible for the fall 
of Hospitaller Malta. Nor would it be fair to compare and contrast, as 
has been done, Hompesch with L’Isle Adam and de Valette. It is not fair 
because the contexts they lived in were distinctly different. 
By the end of the eighteenth century [I wrote in 1998]74 the nature of medieval warfare, 
the medieval concept of chivalry, and the idea of the fighting crusader had long been 
forgotten; their living image, as Henry Kamen claims of Philip II, ‘languished in the 
realm of uninformed mythology’.75 The uninterrupted process of change constitutes the 
quintessence of history. The eighteenth century, with its cool rationalism, its enlightened 
notions of government, its Physiocratic theories of commerce, and its vigorously 
growing trend of secularism and anticlericalism, bears no semblance to the fifteenth or 
sixteenth century. After all, it was during L’Isle Adam’s magistracy that the island of 
Rhodes was lost permanently to the Ottoman Turks. On the other hand, contrary to what 
traditional history has always ascertained, credit for the outcome of the Turkish siege 
of Malta can only in part be attributed to de Valette’s leadership and military strategy. 
‘There are some myths’, observes Fernand Braudel, ‘that historians 
persist in perpetuating, come what may’.76 It was not my purpose at 
Palmela twenty years ago and it is not my purpose today, 
nor has it ever been my intention, either to exonerate and rehabilitate Hompesch, or 
73 H.J.A. Sire, The Knights of Malta: A Modern Resurrection (London, 2016).
74 Mallia-Milanes, ‘Grandmaster Ferdinand von Hompesch’, 95.
75 H. Kamen, Philip of Spain (London, 1997).
76 F. Braudel, The Identity of France, trans. Siân Reynolds (London, 1991), ii, 168.
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in any way belittle his highly esteemed predecessors. Rather, what I would like to 
underscore is that it is a sacred duty of historical research to promote a courageous 
reassessment of past interpretations, to revisit fearlessly the past which our predecessors 
had reconstructed, and re-evaluate with academic rigour their methods, their approach, 
their conclusions.77 
There is another side to these recriminations against Hompesch. 
February 1797 marks the end of Napoleon’s first Italian campaign when 
he drove the Austro-Russian armies out of the whole peninsula. By 
then Napoleon had already proved himself to be the foremost military 
and political genius in Europe. By implication, Hompesch, with no 
supporting funds to strengthen his stand, had been 
expected by his critics to display an indomitable spirit, an over-powerful dynamism, and 
a frigid determination. These form an intricate set of extraordinary qualities that would 
have collectively succeeded (or so his political foes must have thought) in containing 
the tide which the French Revolution had unleashed and was sweeping all over Europe; 
in withholding the radically wide-ranging social and political transformation which it 
had set in motion; indeed, in ‘deforming’ the entire revolutionary achievement78
permanently, something which no one else in Europe had ever succeeded 
in doing. 
This approach towards Hompesch demonstrates the quintessence of 
traditional history par excellence, the ‘great man’ approach, attributing 
to man qualities which do not in fact belong to him. Man does not enjoy 
the powers to bring about long-term structural change. It is the context 
in which he lives that determines change. The economic, social, cultural 
forces, war, the weather: these are the elements which can generate the 
process of permanent change, forces that are far more powerful than 
man. No grand master, or any other great man, could hope to annihilate 
the revolutionary movement. No grand master or any other man could 
hope to change the course of history.
The unfavourable image of Hompesch which his detractors so 
diligently drew to denigrate him in his own day may perhaps be best 
countered by a value judgement which, of all commentators, Napoleon 
77 Mallia-Milanes, ‘Grandmaster Ferdinand von Hompesch’, 95.
78 Ibid., 6.
136
SYMPOSIA MELITENSIA NUMBER 12 (2016) 
himself made in his later years, not without an extremely fine sense 
of cynicism: ‘The Knights did nothing shameful,’ he said. ‘No one is 
obliged to perform impossibilities.’79
To conclude
Lest I’ll be misunderstood or misinterpreted, I wish to make a small 
confession by way of conclusion. I have always believed, and I have 
always taught several generations of young historians accordingly, that 
nobody can ever claim the last word in history. History is reconstruction 
on surviving authentic evidence; history too is interpretation. The 
present paper has set out explicitly to direct attention to a twofold 
traditional misconception concerning the Order of the Hospital in the 
later eighteenth century. This is the attribution of the surrender of Malta 
in 1798 to the alleged decline of the institution. I hope to have made my 
view clear – that the fall of Hospitaller Malta had been the sole direct 
impact of the French Revolution. On the other hand, it has not been the 
purpose of the present paper to claim that the Order did not suffer any 
form or degree of internal crisis. My position today is that the theory of 
decline has not yet been definitively proven. I am prepared to change 
my position tomorrow, to retract my claim hurriedly, if historians, 
instead of repeatedly turning myths into facts, instead of spreading and 
promoting traditional misconceptions, albeit unwittingly, come up with 
sufficiently valid empirical evidence to show that, by the time of the fall 
of the Bastille, there were clear visible signs of disintegration within the 
entire Hospitaller edifice, that the institution was coming to pieces, that 
it had indeed reached a stage of no return. The extraordinary faculty of 
resilience, the remarkable capacity to spring back into shape, to recover 
quickly from extremely difficult situations, has consistently been the 
hallmark of the Hospital throughout its history. Every crisis of radical 
displacement, far-reaching and thorough though it was, from Jerusalem 
through Acre, Rhodes, to Malta, and indeed that of the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, constituted a threshold of transformation. There 
79 L. Butler, ‘The Order of St John in Malta: An Historical Sketch’, in Council of Europe, 
The Order of St John in Malta, with an exhibition of paintings by Mattia Preti, Painter and 
Knight (Malta, 1970), 44.
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is a great irony in all this. Not only is historical reality curiously averse 
to the idea or vision of decline, the Hospital, after almost a millennium 
since its inception, is still a living organism today – a phenomenon that 
in the early nineteenth century was designated as enjoying an innate 
quality not only of resilience, but indeed of immortality.80
80 Sire, pp. viii, xi, 68.
